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Abstract
MNCs gain competitive advantage through leveraging initiatives generated by their subsidiary
networks. Yet we continue to have limited understanding of the complex conditions which promote
initiatives. By integrating the subsidiary entrepreneurship literature and strategy development
theory, we argue that the subsidiary’s approach to strategy development mediates the relationship
between entrepreneurship and strategic initiative generation. We test our propositions on data
generated from surveying the total population of Irish subsidiaries of foreign MNCs. Our findings
confirm that an entrepreneurial subsidiary’s engagement in formal strategy development makes it
better at generating strategic initiatives. This evidences the need for headquarters to encourage
both subsidiary entrepreneurship and strategy development if they are to optimise the contribution
from their subsidiary operations.
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1.0 Introduction
A key premise of MNC related literature is that individual subsidiaries, through exposure to their
idiosyncratic network of relationships and local opportunities can pro-actively generate strategic
initiatives (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Ghoshal and Bartlett, 1990; Johnson and Medcof, 2007). The
MNC then exploits this subsidiary contribution through its ability to transfer these initiatives across
its dispersed operations to create a competitive advantage (Boehe, 2007; Ghoshal and Bartlett,
1990;Gupta and Govindarajan, 2000; Kostova and Roth, 2003; Williams, 2009). From a subsidiary
management perspective, initiatives also serve to improve the unit’s reputation and influence within
its MNC (Ambos et al, 2010), and the enhanced bargaining power in resource negotiations with
headquarters (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004) reduces the risk of closure or relocation of its activities.

Subsidiary strategic initiatives have been defined as ‘entrepreneurial undertakings that … allow the
subsidiary to tap into new opportunities’ outside of the parent’s home country (Ambos et al, 2010,
pp. 2), capturing often autonomous ‘under the radar’ (Delany, 2000) development of products,
technologies and international business activities by subsidiary operations (Birkinshaw, 1997).
Studies to identify pre-requisites for subsidiary generation of strategic initiatives have primarily
focused on the direct influence of contextual factors (Andersson et al, 2007; Birkinshaw, 1997;
Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005, Johnson and Medcof, 2007; Williams, 2009). While entrepreneurship
is associated with a broad range of contribution in the mainstream entrepreneurship literature
(Anderson et al, 2009; Brown et al, 2001; Burgelman, 1984; Covin et al, 2006), the relationships is
assumed yet largely untested in the subsidiary literature (Birkinshaw, 1997; Young and Tavares,
2004). However, of potentially greater managerial importance than empirically validating this
relationship, is the need to achieve a greater understanding of the influence of subsidiary activities
on the entrepreneurship / initiative generation relationship.

Prompted by recent explorations of the relationship between entrepreneurship and other
‘organisational phenomenon’ (Dess et al, 2003; Covin et al, 2006; Anderson et al, 2009), we argue
that a critical management routine (Papadakis et al, 1998), strategy development activities
influences how entrepreneurship translates into the generation of strategic initiatives. We contend
that subsidiary strategy development activities (subsidiary generation of strategy for their unit
independently of headquarters as referred to by Boehe, 2007; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005;
Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2006; Dorrenbacher and Geppert, 2009; Taggart, 1998), influences
the benefits of entrepreneurship, particularly the generation of strategic initiatives. This knowledge
gap merits explicit examination as MNCs rely on their international networks to supplement home
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country knowledge and develop strategic initiatives which can be utilised across the organisation
(Almeida and Phene, 2004; Andersson et al, 2007; Gnyawali et al, 2009). It also responds to calls for
research to adopt an interdisciplinary perspective as it investigates how subsidiary entrepreneurial
opportunity seeking behaviour combines with advantage seeking through critical routines
(Papadakis et al, 1998). Most importantly this study generates explicit insights for managers on how
a fundamentally important management practice, their strategy development activities, combines
with subsidiary entrepreneurship to influence their unit’s contribution to the MNC.

This paper firstly empirically validates the relationship between entrepreneurship and strategic
initiative generation, an assertion which is ubiquitous in the literature but lacking empirical
validation (Young and Tavares, 2004). It then explores how strategy development activities intervene
in the entrepreneurship / initiative generation relationship. Our analysis demonstrates that
entrepreneurial subsidiaries which engage in formal strategy development are better at generating
strategic initiatives. This is (to our knowledge) the first time that the impact of subsidiary’s strategy
development activities on subsidiary contribution has been assessed, despite the wide acceptance of
strategy development as a critical aspect of organizational management and ‘among the main
means through which management choice is actually effected’ (Papadakis et al, 1998, pp. 116). Most
importantly, for both theory and practice, this study provides initial evidence of the potential impact
of any move from federal MNC structures to a ‘global factory’ (Buckley, 2009) approach
incorporating centralised decision making and reducing local discretion for subsidiary management.
If the erosion of federal MNC structures impacts subsidiary ability to engage in strategy
development, we contend that it will also affect the potential of entrepreneurial subsidiaries to
contribute to the organisation through strategic initiative generation. Finally, aside from its potential
for theory development, this area is particularly relevant to practitioners as understanding how
approaches to strategy development influence the benefits of subsidiary entrepreneurship is critical
to protecting and developing their unit within the MNC.

The next section of this paper provides the theoretical views of subsidiary position within the
federative MNC, and the theoretical impact of a shift to the MNC global factory style operation for
subsidiary entrepreneurship, strategy development processes, and initiative generation. Section 3
builds on this conceptual background to develop specific arguments for a mediating role for strategy
development. Section 4 describes the research methodology while Section 5 presents and analyses
the findings obtained from a survey targeting all the foreign subsidiaries of MNC in Ireland. Finally
we discuss the implications of our findings for both theory and practice.
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2.0 Conceptual Background
2.1 Federal MNCs
The evolution of International Business theory demonstrates two contrasting perspectives on the
current position and future role of MNC subsidiary units. The federative view perceives MNCs as
heterarchies (Andersson et al, 2007; Mudambi, 2008), with headquarters gently leading its ‘national’
subsidiaries, and exploiting their access to new knowledge, ideas and opportunities (Andersson et al,
2002).The competitive advantage of the MNC is derived from its subsidiary network (Bartlett and
Ghoshal, 1989), as it promotes organisational learning ‘from local systems of innovation, using and
integrating local resources and competencies, and generally introducing a heightened level of
dynamism into the parents’s MNC”,(Mudambi and Navarra, 2004, pp. 387). The primary theoretical
dilemma within this perspective is how headquarters can guide and harvest subsidiary potential
within the MNC organisational structure while restraining opportunistic behaviour and restraining
the bargaining strength of powerful subsidiaries (Holm and Sharma, 2006; Kotabe and Mudambi,
2004; Mudambi and Navarra, 2004; Watson O’Donnell, 2000).

An emerging alternative perspective proposes that the federal structure of the MNC, if it ever
existed to any great extent, is threatened by escalating headquarters control (Buckley and Ghauri,
2004). This is facilitated by disintegrating trader barriers (Mudambi, 2008) combined with
developing information and communication technology (ICT) capabilities (Boehe, 2007; Yamin and
Sinkovics, 2007). This allows value chains and inter-unit relationships to be controlled and coordinated across both subsidiaries and national borders (Mudambi, 2008). It also facilitates greater
outsourcing of those activities which headquarters deems as peripheral or less profitable (Boehe,
2007). Perhaps the most notable consequence of disaggregating value chains is the reduction of the
relevance of the ‘national’ or miniature replica subsidiary (Birkinshaw, Omar and David, 2001)
embedded in host country and nearby markets. This implies that an MNC’s ‘subsidiary’ in a particular
host country may comprise several separate departments, each individually addressing a different
part of the value chain, or of numerous value chains, with as many reporting lines operating
independently of each other. The essence and implications of this new MNC organisational structure
have led to the vision of the MNC as a global factory (Buckley, 2009).

2.2 Implications of Global Factory Structures
The emergence of these conflicting perspectives prompts a wider debate as to whether any shift to a
global factory (Buckley, 2009; Buckley and Ghauri, 2004) should concern the MNC and subsidiary

4

managers. Under the federal structure, the ability of subsidiaries to access knowledge, ideas and
opportunities underpins their value in generating initiatives for diffusion and exploitation across the
wider organisation (Andersson et al, 2002), stimulating the ‘constant reinvention’ required to
succeed in the global environment (Birkinshaw, 1997; Birkinshaw et al, 1998). Subsidiary
entrepreneurship plays a critical role in driving this reinvention and generating initiatives
(Birkinshaw, 1997). We propose that MNC subsidiaries will display a similar tendency to individual
independent organisations and vary in their level of entrepreneurship, as captured by their
‘entrepreneurial orientation’ which incorporates dimensions of risk taking, pro-activeness and
innovativeness (Covin and Slevin, 1989; Covin et al, 2006), and ranges along a continuum from
extremely conservative to very entrepreneurial (Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999).

In examining theoretical models of how organisations benefit from entrepreneurship, we identified
initial explorations of how critical organisational elements translate the benefit of entrepreneurship
into firm performance and strategic learning (Covin et al, 2006; Anderson et al, 2009). Developing
these insights in a subsidiary context, we argue that a critical management routine (Papadakis et al,
1998), strategy development activities, influences the entrepreneurship / initiative relationships or
how entrepreneurship translates into the generation of strategic initiatives. We contend that
subsidiary strategy development activities (subsidiary generation of strategy for their unit
independently of headquarters as referred to by Boehe, 2007; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005;
Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2006; Dorrenbacher and Geppert, 2009; Taggart, 1998), facilitates
entrepreneurial subsidiaries to generate strategic initiatives. This knowledge gap merits explicit
examination as MNCs rely on their international networks to supplement home country knowledge
and develop strategic initiatives which can be utilised across the organisation.

While the possible repercussions of MNC structural changes on the ability of the subsidiary to be
entrepreneurial are outside the scope of this paper (see Birkinshaw, 1997, for an analysis of
contextual facilitators of subsidiary entrepreneurship), we anticipate that a shift from a federal
configuration would negatively impact subsidiary engagement in strategy development. It is now
widely acknowledged, although to the best of our knowledge, as yet untested, that subsidiaries
engage in strategy development (Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Dorrenbacher and Geppert, 2009;
Taggart 1998). Clearly, subsidiary strategy is developed within the constraints of MNC ownership but
it captures the potential for subsidiary managers to use their ‘strategic discretion’ in response to
changing circumstances (Birkinshaw, 1997; White and Poynter, 1984). We argue that any diminution
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on strategy development activities at the subsidiary level may also endanger realisation of the
benefits of subsidiary entrepreneurship.

A shift to disaggregating value chains may provide the MNC overall with operational flexibility
(Buckley and Ghauri, 2004, Mudambi, 2008), but may also erode the location bound advantages
stimulating local learning and responsiveness, which can be leveraged across the organisation
(Gnyawali et al, 2009). Most importantly, it may restrict a subsidiary’s capacity to view its activities
and contribution to the MNC in totality in the way facilitated by the miniature replica unit. Even if
the MNC maintains subsidiaries as distinct entities there is no doubt that ICT enabled access to
current, detailed operational and strategic data can facilitate greater headquarters’ control and coordination of both what happens within the subsidiary and its internal and external relationships.
This has negative consequences for both subsidiary autonomy and initiative taking (Yamin and
Sinkovics, 2007). However, while the degree of change may not be as radical as the global factory
predicts there is a strong need to understand the potential implications of any reduction in the
nature and activities of subsidiary units.

Inherent in a subsidiary’s ability to engage in developing plans and alternatives is the unit’s
definition as a strategic entity, sufficiently bounded and delineated within its organisation and its
environment, and responding to local events and opportunities. As noted by Boehe (2007, 490), the
federative structure implies ‘relatively autonomous subsidiaries, each with its own organisational or
strategic goals and self-contained (not directly interdependent) activities”. The degree of subsidiary
responsibility and autonomy will vary, as some may operate with a narrow range of value activities
(Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2006; Roth and Morrison, 1992), for example only executing
marketing or manufacturing activities (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1986). While acknowledging the
variation, the literature consistently assumes that subsidiaries operate with a specific mandate
(Birkinshaw and Hood, 1997; Delaney, 1998; Taggart, 1998) and some degree of decision making
ability (Boehe, 2007; Dorrenbacher and Gammelgaard, 2006; White and Poynter, 1984). In contrast,
the global factory style MNC reduces the organisation’s presence in a location to units comprising
disconnected strands of value chains, controlled and co-ordinated by a remote headquarters
(Buckley, 2009). Based on the implicitly negative impact of such a migration on subsidiary strategy
development activities, we explore its implications for the ability of subsidiaries to contribute to the
MNC. In particular, we examine if subsidiary engagement in strategic planning facilitates the benefits
of entrepreneurship in generating strategic initiatives.
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We propose firstly that entrepreneurial subsidiaries generate strategic initiatives, and then that
those entrepreneurial subsidiaries who engage in strategy development are better at generating
initiatives which can be exploited by the MNC. If engaging in strategy development enhances a
subsidiary’s ability to generate initiatives, then it is critical that subsidiaries engagement in strategy
development is facilitated by the MNC. From a managerial perspective, as subsidiaries which
contribute more are likely to have their charter (MNC assigned activities and business
responsibilities) maintained and extended gain (Birkinshaw and Hood, 1998; Delany, 2000), insights
into how they can enhance the benefits of subsidiary entrepreneurship through their strategy
development approaches are particularly valuable.

3.0 Hypotheses Development
3.1 Subsidiary Entrepreneurship and Strategic Initiative Relationship
The growing acceptance of corporate entrepreneurship (Brown et al, 2001) compels both academics
and practitioners to recognise its benefits in driving responses to the demands and opportunities
within their particular environment, as ‘firm specific advantages...continually obsolesce and have to
be regularly renewed’ (Buckley and Casson, 1998, pp. 28). Corporate entrepreneurship can lead to
the redirection of strategy in response to environmental opportunities, continual redefinition of
organisational boundaries and eventually to reconceptualising of strategic domains (Barringer and
Bluedorn, 1999; Burgelman, 1983; Covin and Slevin, 1991; Kuratko et al,1990). Miller (1983, pp. 770)
argues that entrepreneurial behaviour is not an individual or small firm phenomenon, as it can ‘be
performed by entire organisations which are decentralised’, occurring at and across all levels of the
corporation (Zahra, 1993), regardless of scale (Quinn, 1985). We propose that entrepreneurship can
be observed at the subsidiary level, and that units will vary in the level of entrepreneurship
exhibited, as captured by their entrepreneurial orientation.

The three dimensions of entrepreneurship, pro-activeness, risk taking and innovativeness (Covin and
Slevin, 1988; 1989) are all implicitly associated with the experimentation (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996)
and exploration (Covin and Slevin, 1991). For example, Lumpkin and Dess (1996: 142) refer to the
impact of the innovativeness dimension on a ‘firm’s tendency to engage in and support new ideas,
novelty, experimentation’ which Zahra (1999, pp. 169) asserts results in ‘pioneering the
development of new products, processes and services’. Entrepreneurship, and particularly the proactiveness dimension implies to pre-empting competitors which when combined with risk taking
inherently implies entry into ‘novel business arenas’ (Anderson et al, 2009), new business models,
and new strategic approaches or initiatives.
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Entrepreneurship within a decentralised or federal structure recognises the potential for a subsidiary
unit‘s idiosyncratic experience in its local environment and how it is embedded with in its particular
network to potentially enables it to make a unique contribution to the MNC (Gnyawli et al, 2009).
While initiatives at the firm level are likely to be reflected in growth or financial position, we suggest
that for subsidiaries it also involves strategic actions or initiatives which improve the subsidiary’s
standing or role within the MNC, and can be exploited across the organisation to create competitive
advantage (Andersson et al, 2007; Birkinshaw, 1997; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005, Williams, 2009).
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between subsidiary entrepreneurship and
strategic initiative generation.

3.2 Entrepreneurship, Strategy Development and Initiative, Direct and Mediating Relationships
The complexities attaching to subsidiary behaviour arise from its operation within two specific
contexts; the internal MNC market comprising customer, supplier and network relationships with
sister subsidiary and headquarters, and an external business context encompassing customers,
suppliers, networks and broader institutions (Birkinshaw et al, 2005). Within both these contexts it
must operate under the control and co-ordination of headquarters, as headquarters ultimately
determines strategy for the overall MNC. However, within the overall strategy cascading down from
the centre, it is accepted that federal structures permit sufficient latitude for subsidiaries to develop
specific unit strategies to meet these complex contextual demands, and to achieve local
responsiveness and exploit opportunities within their unique multifaceted environments
(Birkinshaw, 1997; Cantwell and Mudambi, 2005; Dorrenbacher and Gammelgard, 2006). However,
we have little knowledge of the strategy development activities within subsidiaries or their
implications for subsidiary contribution to the MNC (Dorrenbacher and Geppert, 2009). This critical
gap is problematic as MNCs rely on the contributions generated by their international networks to
supplement home country knowledge and develop new more creative perspectives on activities
(Andersson et al, 2002).

We argue that subsidiary strategy development activities will influence the relationship between
subsidiary entrepreneurship and the creation of strategic initiatives. As an entrepreneurial
orientation captures an organisation’s ‘underlying philosophy, which tends to flavour the overall
decision making framework of …management’, (Miles and Arnold, 1991, pp. 49) and as the essence
of strategy is effecting management choice (Papadakis et al, 1998) under increasingly turbulent
environmental conditions, we propose that the effectiveness of subsidiary entrepreneurship as
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represented by the level of strategic initiative generation will by influenced by subsidiary strategy
development activities. The potential commonalities between entrepreneurship and strategic
management are already identified in the literature (Covin et al, 2006; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Lyon
et al, 2000). For example, Anderson et al (2009: 220) describe entrepreneurial orientation as a
‘strategic construct that captures a firm’s strategy making practices, management philosophies and
firm level behaviours’.

Complimenting investigation of the direct entrepreneurship / initiative relationship with exploring
mediating effects may help achieve a better understanding of the complex tensions between
subsidiary opportunity seeking and advantage seeking, and the significance of routines within the
subsidiary in facilitating entrepreneurship. Identifying the associations between these factors will
increase awareness of the impact in any erosion in the subsidiary’s potential to develop strategy.
From a managerial perspective, our study will demonstrate the role of strategy development
activities in delivering the benefits of subsidiary entrepreneurship. In selecting variables for
examination we identified four critical elements in the literature which would influence the
entrepreneurship / initiative generation relationship in specific context of subsidiary operations.
These comprise; HQ Constraints on subsidiary strategy development as subsidiary entrepreneurship
is associated with subsidiary autonomy to make decisions independently of its parent (Birkinshaw et
al, 1998) and some discretion or decision making capacity is implicit in the development of
subsidiary strategy, subsidiary engagement in Formal Planning as the critical strategy development
activity, the role of Powerful Political Groups in subsidiary decision making as organisations are
‘political arenas’ and powerful groups drive strategic decisions (Bailey et al, 2000) and the expected
role of subsidiary leadership in implementing an entrepreneurial strategic vision (Heller, 1999) as
represented by the Visionary CEO construct.

HQ Constraints. Entrepreneurship is associated with freedom to act and to respond to market
opportunities, which implies flexibility and responsiveness to changing circumstances (Birkinshaw,
1997; Covin and Slevin, 1989, 1991; Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Implicit in entrepreneurship is the
ability to be pro-active, to actively seek markets, new products and novel ways of selling them,
initiate competitive actions, to be bold (Covin and Slevin, 1991). This implies a closeness to your
external network, particularly your competitors and their potential response to your actions, a
market knowledge (Andersson et al, 2009) that provides an instinctive ability to judge when to
initiate initiatives and their likelihood of success. We argue that it is implicit that such knowledge is
only acquired through an on the ground knowledge from the grass roots up. This after all was the
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rationale for the MNC structure in the first place, to access dispersed markets, resources, knowledge
and capabilities (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; 1990; Boehe, 2007). This leads to the expectation that
there will be a negative relationship between subsidiary entrepreneurship and headquarters
imposition of constraints on subsidiary strategy development.

While it is argued that ICT will enable headquarters access to subsidiary networks (Yamin and
Sinkovics, 2007), it is unlikely that this would fully compensate for the grass roots knowledge that
proximity provides (Audretsah and Feldman, 1996; Jaffe et al, 1993). In addition, Golden (1992)
argues that the competence of ‘Prospector’ or more entrepreneurial type units is particularly
enhanced by having control over their planning processes enabling them to respond quickly to
change within dynamic environments. Similarly, we expect that restraints on subsidiary potential to
create strategy will inhibit its ability to initiate responses to fast disappearing market opportunities.
We argue that this will diminish the effects of subsidiary entrepreneurship in generating strategic
initiatives.
Hypothesis 2.1: There is a negative relationship between subsidiary entrepreneurship and HQ
Constraints on subsidiary strategy development.
Hypothesis 2.2 HQ Constraints on subsidiary strategy development negatively mediates the
relationship between subsidiary entrepreneurship and strategic initiative generation.

Formal Planning. Entrepreneurship is associated with the ability to be responsive to changing
opportunities and to exploit unexpected potential and prospects. We propose that entrepreneurial
units will be more likely to engage in formal planning as they will evaluate alternative courses of
action when exploring potential market opportunities. Entrepreneurship has formerly been
considered as more suited to incremental approaches due to its association with dynamic markets
requiring greater responsiveness (Andersson et al, 2007; Covin and Slevin, 1991). However, we argue
that while entrepreneurship involves risk taking, it is does not imply reckless, so risks must be
routinely evaluated and measured. Evaluation requires information which is associated with
environmental scanning and the other procedural activities inherent in a formal approach (Barringer
and Bluedorn, 1999). While there is an argument that the act of stating a strategy encourages
management’s adherence to the plan (Mintzberg, 1994), we propose that stating a strategy does not
imply that it will not be adapted to meet changing circumstances and evolving opportunities, but
that there will be a defined route and destination. Continuous searching for new ways of gaining
competitive advantage is fundamental to strategy development (Barringer and Bluedorn, 1999),
which compliments the perspective of entrepreneurship as driving change (Lumpkin and Dess,
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2001), challenging the status quo, acting on new opportunities (Covin and Slevin, 1988) and
converting an idea into a strategic reality (Subramaniam and Venkatraman, 1999). We suggest that
entrepreneurial units will be more likely to engage in formal planning as they will implicitly and
proactively engage in evaluating and scanning activities.

Barringer and Bluedorn (1999: 424) support the notion that ‘entrepreneurial behaviour does not
imply an abandonment of the rational-deliberate ‘scan-formulate-implement-evaluate’ approach to
planning. What entrepreneurial behaviour does imply is that the pace of this process must be
accelerated and made more flexible because the essence of entrepreneurship is capitalising on
environmental change’. We suggest that entrepreneurial subsidiaries which engage in formal
planning will be more likely to generate strategic initiatives through the exploration of alternative
approaches. Menon et al, (1999) contend that the generation of alternatives which is associated
with a formal planning style allows managers to better assess the value and viability of the available
options. Similarly, Kohli and Jaworski (1990) suggest that the market responsiveness inherent in
entrepreneurship requires continuous collection of strategic information, which is also associated
with formal strategic planning. The pro-activeness, risk taking and innovativeness critical to
entrepreneurship will drive exploration of alternatives and engage the subsidiary in their realisation.
We argue that entrepreneurial subsidiaries are less entrenched in their modes of behaviour and less
constrained in generating ‘strategic options’ (Miller, 1993), leading Ireland et al, (2001) to suggest
that the ability to be creative to maximise the benefit of resources is a core entrepreneurial function.
As being creative is often more by design than pure chance, we propose that when entrepreneurial
subsidiaries adopt a methodical approach to examining strategic alternatives they are more likely to
trigger initiatives.
Hypothesis 3.1: There is a positive relationship between subsidiary entrepreneurship and
formal planning processes.
Hypothesis 3.2 : Formal planning processes mediate the relationship between subsidiary
entrepreneurship and strategic initiative generation.

Power of Political Groups. To date the effects of politics within MNCs has been considered in terms
of the dynamics between headquarters and subsidiaries (Mudambi and Navarra, 2004), or between
sister subsidiaries. There is, as far as we could confirm, an absence of empirical studies investigating
the effects of dominant coalitions within the subsidiary, and specifically how the presence and
influence of these powerful political groups may impact subsidiary entrepreneurship. The political
dimension captures the need to recognise that decisions are often the outcomes of negotiations and
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compromises between various influential groups. These groups are formed from coalitions with
shared objectives in pursuit of their own self interest (Bailey et al, 2000). Entrepreneurship implies
that employees have a certain freedom of decision making (Burns and Stalker, 1961) and
entrepreneurial organisations are more likely to attract strong minded, creative people than their
conservative counterparts. We suggest that such units are more likely to encourage the
development of powerful coalitions, and that whether entrepreneurial actions result in strategic
initiatives will depend on the alignment of these initiatives with the dominant coalition within the
subsidiary.

The presence of strong coalitions suggests that strategic initiatives generated by the subsidiary will
reflect the interests of the dominant political group. Bailey et al (2000, pp. 153) observe that ‘the
level of influence these stakeholders [the political groups] are able to exercise is conditional upon
the organisation’s dependency upon such groups’. Reid (1989) purports that the existence of strong
powerful coalitions fails to stimulate innovation, whereas power sharing, similarly to the
participative, sharing approach of an entrepreneurial posture, promotes collaboration, information
sharing and acceptance of new ideas (Kanter, 1983). In addition, strong coalitions are associated
with an aversion to risk taking, as existing powerful groups are reluctant to risk any change in their
power balance. This may restrict the number of strategic alternatives considered to those which
serve their narrow frame of reference. For example, the responsiveness to new information and
opportunities inherent in entrepreneurship (Grinstein, 2008) may be restrained if it is outside of the
interests of the dominant coalition. We propose that powerful coalitions within the subsidiary can
hamper change and embed the unit within existing approaches even if there is an appetite for
change.
Hypothesis 4.1: Hypothesis 3.1: There is a negative relationship between subsidiary
entrepreneurship and the Power of Political Groups.
Hypothesis 4.2: The Power of Political Groups negatively mediate the relationship between
subsidiary entrepreneurship and strategic initiative generation.

Visionary CEO. At the organisation level, senior managers and particularly the CEO are responsible
for entrepreneurial leadership and for defining the firm’s purpose and strategies, to be ‘the
purveyors of the entrepreneurial vision’ (Heller, 1999). A strong vision which encourages
organisational members to ‘buy-in’ is regarded as critical to delivering the benefits of
entrepreneurship (Hanks and McCarrey, 1993; Heller, 1999). The findings of Barringer and
Bluedorn’s (1999: 436) empirical study are ‘supportive of the general notion that employee
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participation at all levels is an essential part of the entrepreneurial process’. At the subsidiary level,
an entrepreneurial subsidiary also implies strong visionary leadership combined with a participative
management style (Birkinshaw et al, 1998: Kanter, 1985; Pinchott, 1985). As employee participation
and consultation is an essential tenet of the successful pursuit of entrepreneurship (Burgelman,
1983; Sathe,1988), it is expected that entrepreneurial subsidiaries will attract and , encourage CEOs
who embrace this management approach (Dess, et al, 1997), A strong visionary CEO is also required
to drive implementation of an entrepreneurial strategy.
Hypothesis 5.1: There is a positive relationship between subsidiary entrepreneurship and a
Visionary CEO.
Hypothesis 5.2: A Visionary CEO mediates the relationship between subsidiary
entrepreneurship and strategic initiative generation.

These proposed relationships are summarised in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1 - Mediated Relationships between Subsidiary Entrepreneurship, Strategy Development
Process and Strategic Initiative Generation

Constraints on
Subsidiary
Strategy Dev

Subsidiary
Entrepreneurship

Formal
Planning

Strategic
Initiative
Generation

Powerful
Political
Groups
Visionary
CEO

Controls
Environment
Age
Size
Industry

4.0 Method
Sample and Data Collection
The entire population of over 1,100 subsidiaries of MNCs located in Ireland was targeted for this
study. On the basis of a focus group and pre-test results, and similarly to other studies of subsidiary
behaviour (for example, Holm and Sharma, 2006) the Managing Director was selected as the key
informant. A comprehensive data base was developed based on the website of Ireland’s National
Development Agency, Industrial Development Authority Ireland. A random sample of subsidiaries
was contacted to ensure that contact details were accurate and up to date.
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The design and administration of the mail questionnaire followed the ‘tailored design method’ of
Dillman (2000). The success of this approach is reflected in the profile of respondents, as all have
general manager / director titles, and a response rate of 24% which compares favourably to the
average top management survey response rate (Hult and Ketchen, 2001). While this response
reduces the probability of non response bias (Weiss and Heide, 1993), standard tests confirmed an
absence of significant differences between early and late respondents on a range of characteristics.

The draft questionnaire was pre-tested by an expert group comprising both experienced commercial
managers and academics. Seven point Likert scales (anchored at 1= ‘not at all’ and 7 = ‘to a very
large extent’) were utilised throughout. To increase content validity existing measures were utilised
and modified where necessary to reflect the subsidiary as the unit of analysis, and amendments
were assessed by the expert group. To reduce the issue of acquiescence or the ‘tendency to agree
with attitude statements regardless of content’ (Podsakoff et al, 2003, pp. 883), reverse scoring was
utilised. In addition, to avoid over-justification issues, respondents were unaware of the
relationships under investigation. Harman’s (1978) single factor test was used post hoc to test for
common method variance. As results indicate that no dominant factor accounted for the majority of
the total variance (Menon et al, 1996), common method variance was not considered to be an issue.

Measures
An initial analysis of the responses on all of the variables provided no indication of a restriction of
range problem in the data. The shape of the distribution of the variables was then tested for
normality by calculating values for skewness and kurtosis (Hair et al, 1998). The results indicate that
all of the distributions for the measures can be assumed to be normal at the 99% confidence level.
Little’s test showed that the data was Missing Completely at Random (MCAR). Although the level of
missing data was low, the EM algorithm was used in SPSS to impute missing data. Summary statistics
including means, standard deviations and Cronbach Alphas, along with correlation coefficients are
provided in Table 1. As can be seen the alpha coefficients for the multi item scales are generally in
excess of the minimum 0.70 levels required (Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). The correlation
coefficients were initially reviewed for indications of multi-collinearity effects, but as none of the
correlations co-efficients reach above 0.50 the level of inter-correlations is acceptable (Papadakis et
al, 1998).

< Please insert Table 1 here>
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All items were subject to principal component analysis with Varimax rotation in advance of
hypotheses testing. The results as presented in Table 2 show that all items loaded cleanly on their
intended construct with the exception of the innovativeness aspect of the entrepreneurship scale.
This loaded as a separate construct to the other two dimensions, risk taking and pro-activeness.
However, given the strong theoretical support for the additive nature of the entrepreneurial scale
(Covin et al, 2006) and its established use (for example, Covin and Slevin, 1989; 1991; Lee et al, 2001;
Lumpkin and Dess, 1996; Miles and Arnold, 1991) it is acceptable to proceed with combining the
three dimensions, into a single measure of entrepreneurship.
< Please insert Table 2 here>
Strategic Innovation Generation. A three item scale, was adapted from Birkinshaw et al, (1998) to
capture the range of strategic initiatives which can be undertaken by the subsidiary, from competing
for internal opportunities to product development. The respondent was requested to measure the
items over the previous 5 years.
Entrepreneurship. A nine item scale, was adapted from Covin and Slevin’s (1989) entrepreneurial
orientation scale to suit the subsidiary level of analysis. As noted above, this widely accepted scale
captures the dimensions of innovativeness, pro-activeness and risk taking. Higher level scores
indicate an entrepreneurial rather than a conservative orientation.
HQ Constraints: The scale items developed by Bailey, Johnson and Daniels (2000) as capturing
restraints on firm level strategy development were adapted to suit the subsidiary level of analysis,
to capture the constraints imposed by headquarters on development of subsidiary level strategy by
the unit itself.
Formal Planning. The original scale suggested by Bailey et al (2000) was adapted to relate
specifically to the development of subsidiary level strategy, and captures the subsidiary’s approach
to scanning and developing plans. A higher score indicates more systematic analysis and rigorous
consideration of alternatives.
Powerful Political Groups. Bailey et al’s, (2000) five items measure the influence of political groups
on bargaining, negotiation and compromise were adapted to suit the subsidiary level of analysis.
CEO Vision. This measure reflects the consensus in the literature that the strategy development
process is often driven by a strong leader (Dess et al, 1997), particularly in entrepreneurial
organisations (Heller, 1999). The original five item measure developed by Bailey et al, (2000) was
reduced to three items, to reduce redundancy and repetition, as suggested by the expert panel. The
relatively low alpha of 0.61 (below the level of 0.80 achieved by the scale developers) indicates that
the scale may require further adaptation to be fully suited to the subsidiary CEO.
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Control Variables. There are three control variables, subsidiary size, age and environmental
dynamism. Size, measured as the total number of employees within the subsidiary, was log
transformed to overcome any skewness in data. Similarly, subsidiary age, the number of years the
subsidiary existed, was log transformed. Research has demonstrated the strong influence of the
external environment of an organisation on the existence and stimulation of entrepreneurship (Covin
and Slevin, 1991; Karagozoglu and Brown, 1988; Russell, 1999), indicating the necessity for its
inclusion as a control variable. The level of environmental turbulence was operationalised using
Menon et al, (1999) market related measures, reflecting the degree of change in market
competition, opportunities and the rate of change in product technology.

Analytical Techniques
Direct and mediating effects were tested using regression modelling. We adopted Baron and Kenny’s
(1986, pp. 1173) definition of a mediator as a ‘third variable which represents the generative
mechanism through which the focal independent variable is able to influence the dependent
variable of interest’, and their three step process to test for mediation: Step 1, establishes a
relationship between the independent variable, entrepreneurship and the dependent variable,
strategic initiatives. Step 2 considers the relationship between entrepreneurship and each proposed
mediating variable (for example, entrepreneurship and formal planning). Step 3 then measures the
effects of entrepreneurship and each of the proposed mediating variables and initiative. This step
effectively controls for the effect of posture and demonstrates the influence of the mediating
variable.

In assessing the results of the regressions, Baron and Kenny (1986) argue that the independent
variable, entrepreneurship must affect the dependent in the first step, the mediator variable in the
second equation, and then thirdly the mediator must affect the dependent variable in the third
equation while controlling for the influence of the independent variable. For a mediating
relationship to be evidenced, the absolute size as well as the significance of the co-efficients is
critical (Baron and Kenny, 1986) and the effect of the independent variable must be less in the third
equation than in the second equation, and in the predicted direction.

4.0 Results
Table 3 presents the regression results for Step 1 of Baron and Kenny’s 1986) method – establishing
the relationship between the independent variable, entrepreneurship and the dependent variable,
strategic initiatives. Model 1 represents the control equation, while the predictor variable is included
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in Model 2. The relationship between entrepreneurship and initiative generation provides strong
support for Hypothesis 1.

< Please insert Table 3 here>

Step 2 then considers the relationship between entrepreneurship and each proposed mediating
variable, as presented in Table 4. These results demonstrate a strong negative relationship between
entrepreneurship and HQ Constraints on subsidiary strategy development and political groups as
predicted, and a positive relationship with formal planning, supporting hypotheses 2.1, 3.1 and 4.1.
However, the relationship between CEO participative style and entrepreneurship is neither
significant nor in the hypothesised direction, so there is no support for Hypothesis 5.1 or 5.2.
< Please insert Table 4 here>

The results from Step 3 which measures the effects of entrepreneurship and the proposed mediating
variables on initiative are presented in Table 5.
< Please insert Table 5 here>

While we have confirmed that entrepreneurship has a negative effect on HQ Constraints on
subsidiary strategy development, Hypothesis 2.2 which proposes that HQ Constraints on subsidiary
strategy development negatively mediates the relationship between subsidiary entrepreneurship
and strategic initiative generation is not supported. This implies that even if the subsidiary is
constrained from determining its own strategy it will not impact the relationship between
entrepreneurship and the generation of initiatives.

Model 10 confirms hypothesis 3.2 that a formal approach to planning transforms the relationship
between entrepreneurship and strategic initiatives. For a mediating relationship to be evidenced,
the absolute size as well as the significance of the co-efficients is critical (Baron and Kenny, 1986)
and the effect of the independent variable must be less in the third equation then in the second
equation, and in the predicted direction. For example, the co-efficient for entrepreneurship was
positive and significant (beta = 0.33, p<.01, Model 8) in the first equation), positive and significant in
the second equation (beta = 0.25, p<.05, Model 4), and positive but smaller in the third equation
(beta = 0.28, p <.05, Model 10) when the effect of formal planning was also positive and significant
(beta = 0.16, p < .05, Model 10). In addition, the significant influence of the mediating variable,
planning (beta = .16, p <.05) confirms that the result did not arise due to multi-collinearity between
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the independent and the mediating variables. As advised by Noble et al (2002, pp. 40) ‘if the
coefficient for the mediating variable is non-significant in the fourth regression (regressing initiative
on formal planning) but significant in the third regression, then we conclude that the effect of the
mediating variable on the dependent variable in the third regression is a spurious one, due to multicollinearity among the mediating variable and the independent variables’. Compliance with these
requirements confirms that subsidiaries which engage in formal planning are better at generating
strategic initiatives which has potentially strong implications for how subsidiaries should be
managed.

Model 11 demonstrates that powerful political groups fail to meet the requirements for mediation
as defined by Baron and Kenny (1986). For a mediating relationship to be evidenced, the absolute
size as well as the significance of the co-efficients is critical (Baron and Kenny, 1986) and the effect of
the independent variable must be less in the third equation than in the second equation, and in the
predicted direction. While Model 5 demonstrates that entrepreneurship directly reduces the power
of political groups, Model 11 shows that the effects of entrepreneurship is augmented positively by
political coalitions indicating a more complex relationship warranting further exploration.

5.0 Discussion
The purpose of this study was to advance theory by exploring how the subsidiary entrepreneurship /
initiative generation relationship is facilitated by subsidiary strategy development activities. Our
investigation demonstrates the importance of what happens with the subsidiary, as it represents the
initial attempt to explore the effects of a key routine, strategy development processes on subsidiary
contribution to the MNC. We show that formal planning at the subsidiary level of analysis is directly
correlated within initiative generation. More importantly however, our investigation demonstrates
that an entrepreneurial subsidiary which engages in formal strategic planning is better at generating
strategic initiatives.

The study confirms the critical importance of both promoting entrepreneurship within the subsidiary
and encouraging it to engage in strategy development. Results also support the value of proximity to
local markets and networks (Boehe, 2007), and by extension, we would tentatively argue, the
maintenance of the subsidiary as a self contained entity, able to ‘join the dots’ in a bigger picture
and contribute to the MNC by developing strategies to exploit its local knowledge and resources. If
MNC competitive advantage lies in its ability to harness the local knowledge and initiatives of global
operations, then there are inherent danger for both headquarters’ and subsidiary manager in any
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shift to a global factory structure that undermines subsidiary ‘strategic discretion’ (Birkinshaw, 1997;
White and Poynter, 1984).

Demonstrating the interaction between entrepreneurship, strategy development and creation of
initiatives extends our understanding of what happens within the subsidiary. As the essence of
strategy is contributing to competitive advantage through management practices (Papadakis et al,
1998) this tenet is now confirmed at the level of the individual subsidiary. It is not just that
entrepreneurial subsidiaries generate initiatives, but that entrepreneurial subsidiaries which develop
formal strategies are better at generating initiatives: they combine acting entrepreneurially with
thinking strategically. By demonstrating how advantage seeking combines with opportunity seeking
behaviour, we add to our understanding of how entrepreneurship and strategic management theory
can be integrated within the MNC context. Future studies may address the wider benefits of
subsidiary engagement in strategy development, for example how original and creative elements of
subsidiary strategy may be utilised to adapt and re-energise MNC strategies to build competitive
advantage across the group.

As far as we could confirm, this is the first time that the influence of powerful coalitions within the
subsidiary has been considered. The strong correlation between powerful groups and initiative
generation tentatively suggests that dominant coalitions may be effective at delivering on initiatives.
This may be because the strategic initiatives generated are in line with the objectives of the
dominant groups within the subsidiary. However, the negative relationship between
entrepreneurship and the power of coalitions suggests that entrepreneurial subsidiaries may
actually be more cohesive and inclusive than their conservative counterparts. Given that the
predicted negative mediating relationship is not supported by the data, further investigation is
needed to provide meaningful indications of the influence of subsidiary political groupings.

This study also provides initial indications that even where headquarters constrains subsidiary
strategy development these these may not inhibit the unit from developing its own plans. This
supports anecdotal indications (Delany, 2000) that subsidiary strategy cascades down from
headquarters and must then be manipulated to reflect the subsidiary management’s objectives.
Subsidiaries, regardless of headquarters’ plans for their development are constantly seeking ‘an
edge’ to consolidate and develop their position within the MNC, but that often these attempts are
kept ‘below the radar’ of headquarters (Delany, 2000).
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Perhaps the non significant findings in relation to the influence of the CEO’s participative style is
particularly surprising given the acknowledgement both within the practitioner and academic
literature that subsidiary management are critically aware of the role of initiatives in competing
effectively in both domestic and global markets (Ireland and Hitt, 1999), and for maintaining their
position within the MNC. We suggest that while their intentions may be strong, operation within a
triple helix of environments; their immediate unit, the MNC and its complex network of subsidiaries,
and the local business environment dilutes the impact of their management style, even in
entrepreneurial subsidiaries.

Limitations.
This study has several limitations which may be addressed by further studies, including the effect of
specific host country characteristics which may make Ireland - a peripheral location with a small,
open economy - differ from other host countries. As a research instrument, a questionnaire also falls
short of a sophisticated temporal study (Murray et al, 1995), a factor which may be particularly
relevant given the dynamic nature of entrepreneurship. The use of existing measures has
advantages in terms of validity, but resulted in the need to adapt firm level measures to the
subsidiary unit of analysis, and (although comprehensively reviewed) such adaptations may still not
be entirely appropriate for application to subsidiary structures. There may also be other factors not
captured by the study which influence the relationships under examination: for example, our
theoretical framework does not incorporate organisational structures and other inter-related
contingency factors. In addition, a micro level study of what happens within the subsidiary could
provide further insights into unit strategy development processes.

While the data showed no indications of common method variance during testing, the danger of
relying on a single informant may (to some extent) result in the subsidiary’s entrepreneurship being
an ‘artifact’ of the individual respondent’s own entrepreneurial orientation (Lyon et al, 2000).
However, this approach appears to be a particular feature of research into both entrepreneurial and
international activities. There is also significant potential for feedback loops within our proposed
framework, which future research may also address: for example, subsidiary initiative may itself be
an antecedent to aspects of subsidiary entrepreneurship (such as innovativeness). Future studies in
this area may also wish to empirically investigate the impact of other subsidiary routines or broader
contextual variables, for example, on subsidiary entrepreneurship.

Managerial implications.
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From a headquarters’ perspective our study demonstrates the importance of entrepreneurship and
the need for the organisational context to promote the development of risk taking, pro-active and
innovative behaviour within subsidiaries.

Demonstrating the importance of management practices that support and reinforce subsidiary
entrepreneurship. Opportunities arise from both within and outside the group, if focused internally
like the global factory implies then will fail to recognise and exploit the potential in subsidiary local
environment. Need to extend the subsidiary opportunity horizon rather than constrain it if it is to
benefit from the multiple perspectives and knowledge bases of its subsidiary network.

Headquarters management can then differentiate between those subsidiaries which are generating
high levels of initiative and non contributing subsidiaries and tailor their management skills and
resources accordingly.

Our findings also clearly demonstrates that even when HQ restricts the ability of a subsidiary to
develop a specific strategy for its unit and restrains the unit’s strategic choices, that entrepreneurial
subsidiaries will continue to generate strategic initiatives. However, the surprising finding that
entrepreneurial organisations engage in formal strategic planning indicates that the process of
considering alternatives may be the critical link between entrepreneurship and strategy
development.

A greater understanding of the influence of contextual factors or more directly, subsidiary strategic
posture on the subsidiary’s strategy development process provides headquarters management with
the potential to increase their ability to manipulate and control the level of independent strategy
development which their subsidiary can employ. For example, constraints on subsidiaries may be set
at a level to inhibit or promote independent subsidiary strategy development. The potential links
between subsidiary strategy development and the performance and success of the subsidiary should
give rise to interesting possibilities in terms of patterns of compensation and senior management
motivation. This broad empirical examination of subsidiary strategy development processes should
provide key insights into the level of planning and strategic development undertaken by subsidiary
managers, and the impact of headquarters’ constraints on this process, an area previously
overlooked by both the academic and practitioner literature. A richer understanding of the internal
operations and activities of the subsidiaries of MNCs should support headquarters’ efforts to
maximise the potential benefits from resource allocation, managerial attention and organisational
commitment to its foreign operations.
Basic resources are generally available regardless of location in the developed world (Dunning, 1992)
rendering any individual subsidiary potentially vulnerable to relocation of its activities. The
identification of contextual factors which can be manipulated to potentially reduce relocation or
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closure risk should be of significant interest to subsidiary managers. The technological capacity to
electronically transmit the end product renders its point of origination of minimal importance to the
MNC in terms of market delivery. This increases the importance of any element which positively
differentiates a subsidiary in terms of a relocation decision potentially critical.
A subsidiary’s ability to contribute through recognising opportunities and innovating to meet them
provides a further defence from the relocation of its activities. The MNC’s commitment to a foreign
operation may be determined by its capacity to convert resources and to innovate new goods
(Dunning, 1992) and the ‘sticky’ nature of particular resources in terms of reduced transferability
(Szulanski, 1995). While the generation of position protecting initiatives may be outside a
subsidiary’s specific charter and often they are not given their deserved eminence (Dunning, 1995),
initiatives are generally accepted as positive contributions and should enhance the MNC’s view of
the subsidiary, and its potential to add value.

From both a headquarters and a subsidiary manager perspective, our study highlights the potential
of political power groups within the subsidiary to hamper initiative efforts. Other aspects of
powerful coalitions which may be of interest from both a theoretical and practitioner perspective
include their impact on knowledge transfer within the MNC and on the subsidiary’s strategic
direction and willingness to embrace change.

Demonstrating the contribution of what happens within the subsidiary highlights the potential
dangers of a shift towards the global factory structure (Buckley, 2009). Subsidiary managers may be
criticised for their vested interest in maintaining their subsidiary as a distinct entity (Birkinshaw,
1997) rather than as a compilation of replaceable cogs in an array of disaggregated value chains.
However, we have demonstrated the value of subsidiary contribution to the MNC arising from both
entrepreneurship and strategy development. This indicates that what happens within the subsidiary
may be more complex and have even more elaborate consequences for the MNC than previously
considered.

The growing acceptance of entrepreneurship (Brown, Davidsson and Wiklund, 2001) compels both
practitioners and academics to recognise the benefits of combining strategic or advantage seeking
behaviour, and entrepreneurial or opportunity seeking behaviour within MNCs (Hitt et al, 2001).
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While advantage seeking behaviour relates to the MNC’s ability to manage its subsidiaries ‘dispersed
capabilities’ (Brush et al, 2001, pp. 65), opportunity seeking behaviour involves nurturing the
potential of subsidiaries to seek, recognise and exploit opportunities (Subramaniam and
Venkatraman, 2001). The knowledge, capabilities and innovations developed through recognising
and exploiting opportunities can then be diffused across the organisation to generate sustainable
competitive advantage (Almeida and Phene, 2004; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Eisenhardt and
Martin, 2000; Frost, 2001; Hedlund, 1986; Kim, Park and Prescott, 1999; Teece et al, 1997). The
integration of opportunity seeking and advantage seeking behaviour constitutes the application of
strategic entrepreneurship within the MNC.
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Table 1, Summary Statistics
Mean

SD

Alpha

1

2

3

4

5

1

Entrepreneurship

4.38

.99

0.84

1.00

**

2

Strategic Initiative

3.15

1.49

0.70

.378**

1.00

3

Constraints on Strategy

2.67

1.44

0.81

-.207**

.090

1.00

4

Formal Planning

4.37

1.28

0.87

.264**

.238**

-.030

1.00

5

Power of Political Groups

2.88

1.22

0.86

0.04

.210**

.385**

.045

1.00

6

Visionary CEO

4.06

.99

0.61

-.014

-.010

.078

.053

.145*

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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6

1.00

Table 2, Principal Component Analysis Results
Component

Formal
Planning
EO INV R&D Technol
Leader
EO INVNew Lines
EO INV Dramatic Prod
Change
EO Pro Initiates actions
EO Pro Introduce
Change
EO Pro Undo the
Competitors
EO Risk High risk
appetite
EO Risk Bold Actions
EO Risk Aggressive
explt of ops
INAT Products Past
INAT Bids Past
INAT Activities Past
SC INT Options Ltd
SC INT Growth Ltd
SC INT Innovations Ltd
SC INT HO Imp Strategy
CEO decides
CEO vision
PL Detailed Plans
PL Precise Procedures
PL Search Procedures
PL Alternatives
PL Evaluations
PL Analysis
ORG Compromise
ORG Power Groups
ORG Bargaining
ORG Group Interests
ORG Sponsors

Political
Groups

EO –
Proactiv
e
And Risk

HQ
Determ
Strategy

.198
.166

-.117

.190

Strategic
Initiative
s

EO
Innovati
ve-ness

.446

.514

-.124

.124

.385

.138

.547

-.294

.164

.540

-.193

CEO
Vision

.782
.745
-.229
.322

.237

.789

.181

.189

.750

.104

.223

.783

.137
.162

.197

.777
.151

.118
.188
.300
.112
.120

.117
.101
.196

.598
.754
.784
.855
.818
.793
.589

-.164

.103
.761
.850
.864
.831
.887
.770

.450
-.156
-.111

.103
-.159
-.120

-.109
-.109

-.118

.143

-.350
.870
.835
.154
.122

.145

.788
.775
.772
.842
.792

.159
.107
.101

.107
.283
.199
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.167
-.116

Table 3. Regression Analysis Results, Entrepreneurship and Strategic Initiative Generation

Control Variables
Log Subsidiary Size
Log Subsidiary Age
Environmental Dynamism

Model 1

Model 2

1.05***
-.83**
.41***

1.01***
-.75**
.26**

Predictor Variable:
Entrepreneurship

.33**

Model R2
Adj R2
Model F

0.32
0.31
23.98***

0.35
0.33
20.10***

N=207. Standardized Coefficients Reported.
+ p<0.10, *p<.0.05, **p<.0.01, ***p<.0.001

Table 4. Proposed Mediating Variables and Entrepreneurship and Strategic Initiative Generation
Model 5

Model 6

Constraints on
Formal
Subsidiary Strategy Planning

Powerful
Political Groups

Visionary
CEO

.40*
-.19
-.05

.04
.20
.14

.15
-.67**
.24*

.10
-.27
.24**

-.31**

.25*

-.19+

-.15

0.07
0.05
3.31**

0.09
0.07
3,94**

0.09
0.06
3.79**

0.05
0.03
2.21+

Model 3

Control Variables
Log Subsidiary Size
Log Subsidiary Age
Environmental Dynamism
Predictor Variable:
Entrepreneurship
Model R2
Adj R2
Model F

Model 4

N=207. Standardized Coefficients Reported.
+ p<0.10, *p<.0.05, **p<.0.01, ***p<.0.001
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Table 5. Proposed Mediating Variables and Entrepreneurship and Strategic Initiative Generation

Control Variables
Log Subsidiary Size
Log Subsidiary Age
Environmental Dynamism
Predictor Variables:
Entrepreneurship
HQ Determination of Strategy
Formal Planning
Powerful Political Groups
CEO Vision

Model R2
Adj R2
Model F

Model 7

Model 8

Model 9

Model 10

Model 11

Model 12

1.05***
-.83**
.41***

1.01***
-.75***
.26**

1.0***
-.69**
.28**

1.10***
-.81**
.23**

0.98***
-.60**
.19*

1.01***
-.81**
.23**

.33**

.34***
.07

.28**

.38***

.34**

.16*
.22**
-.07

0.32
0.31
23.98***

0.35
0.33
20.10***

0.37
0.34
17.03***

N=207. Standardized Coefficients Reported.
+ p<0.10, *p<.0.05, **p<.0.01, ***p<.0.001
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0.37
0.34
17.17***

0.38
0.36
17.9***

0.36
0.34
16.8***
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